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The October Crash: Some
Evidence on the Cascade Theory
“It’s the nearesl thing to a meltdown that lever want to see.”
John J. Phelan, Jr., Chairman ofthe NewYork Stock Exchange
HE record one-day decline in stock prices on
October- 19, 1987, stripped roughly 22 pet-cent from
stock values. More disconcerting, however, wet-c
the speed ofthe adjustment, the tumultuous ti-ad-
ing activity in financial markets and the uncer-
tainty that prevailed during the week of October
19. These aspects of the crash bore a surprising
resemblance to previous financial panics that
many thought were historical artifacts outmoded
by modern regulatory and surveillance systems as
well as by advances in the financial sophistication
ofmar’ket participants. The crash shocked this
complacency and reawakened considerable inter’-
est in financial panics and their causes.
Aswith its 1929 predecessor, the list of popular
explanations for- the panic of 1987 runs the gamut
fr-om the purely economic and financial to the
frailties inherent in human nature see opposite
pagel. Recently, a number- ofmore-or-less official
investigating agencies have released reports about
the October panic.’ Generally speaking, these re-
ports do not attempt to identify the reason for the
decline in stock prices. Rather, the)’ focus on the
factors that characterized it as a panic: thesharp-
ness of the decline on October 19 and the tumultu-
ous trading activity that occurred on this day and
during the following week.
Virtually all of the reports agr-ee that the inability
of the New Yorkand other cash market exchanges
to process the unpr-ecedented volume of trades
quickly contributed impor-tantly to the market
turmoil. They disagree widely, however-, about the
reasons for-the sharpness of the decline.
The Brady Commission Repor-t attributes the
downward ‘cascade’’ in stock prices to pro-
grammed trading — more specifically, to the ti-ad-
ing strategies known as index ar-bits-age arid por’tfb-
‘See, for example, the Report of the Presidential Task Force on
MarketMechanisms (1988): U.S. General Accounting Office
(1988): U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (1988):
and the report of Miller, Hawke, Malkiel and Scholes (1987).Some Poptilai’ Njotioiis Regarding the Crash of ‘87
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proposals advanced by the Brady Commission
include:
(1( One agency to coordinate regulatory issues
that have an impact across all financial
markets;
(2( Unified clearing systems aci-oss related
financial markets;
(31 Consistent margin requirements in the cash
and futures markets;
(41 Circuit breaker mechanisms (such as price
limits and coordinated trading halts(; and
(SI Integrated information systems across re-
lated financial markets,’
Proposals 3 and 4 clearly reflect the Commission’s
belief that progi-ammed trading contr-ibuted sig-
nificantly to the panic. Furthermore, the action
taken by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE( to
restrict use of its Designated OrderTurnaround
(DOTI system by progi-am ti-aders suggests that the
officials ofthis exchange also subscribe to the
Brady Commission’s explanation! ‘I’his belief was
reaffirmed more recently, Beginning Fehruaiy 4,
1988, the NYSE has denied use of the DCII’ system
to program traders whenever the DowJones In-
dustrial Average moves up or down by more than
50 points from its previous day’s close,
THE’ cASGAIJE THEORY
The Brady Commission suggests that the stock
market panic is best explained by the ‘cascade
theory.” This theory argues that “mechanical,
price-insensitive selling” by institutions using
portfolio insurance strategies conti’ibuted signifi-
cantly to the break in stock pr-ices! In an effort to
liquidate the equity exposure of their poi-tfolios
quickly, these institutions sold stock index futures
contracts in the Chicago market. Such sales low-
ered the price of the futures contmacts relative to
the price of the equivalent basket of stocks in the
New York cash mar-ket. The decline in thefutur’es
price relative to the cash price induced index ar-hi-
trageurs to purchase futures contiacts in the Clii-
cago mamtet (which, in their view,were under-
valued( and sell (short( the underlying stocks in
the New York market (which, in their view, were
overvalued m’elative to futuresL Thus, index arbi-
trage tr-ansmitted the selling pressur’e from the
Chicago fijtui-es mam-ket to the New Yom-k cash mar-
ket causing cash p1-ices in NewYork to decline,
‘I’he stor does not end here. According to the
theory, the decline in cash prices triggered afur--
ther selling wave in the Chicago market by portfo-
lio insur-ers that index arbitr’ageurs, again, trans-
mitted to the New York mar’ket. ‘i’his process was
r’epeated time after time causing a “downward
cascade’ in stock prices.”
‘i’he Brady Commission suggests that support
for’ the cascade theory can be found by examining
the behavior of the spread (the hasist hetween the
price of stock index futur-es contracts and the cash
prices of the shares undem-lying the contracts.”
The basis is nos-mally positive. Stock index fi.rtui-es
pr-ices generally exceed cash pm’ices because the
net costs of car-rying stock forwar-d Iintei-est cost
less expected diviclends( am-c typically positive.”
During the panic, however, the basis turned nega-
tive. The Comnussion suggests that this obsen’a-
tion is consistent with the cascade theory.
Chart 1 plots both the price ofthe December
Standard and Poor’s 500 futures contract and the
Standard and Poor’s index of 500 common stocks.
The latter- r’epr-esents the cash price of the stocks
underlying the futures contract. The data cover
halt-hour intervals during October 15—23, 1987,
Chait 2 plots the basis — the difference between
the two prices shown in chart lAs one can see,
the basis fell below zero in the late afternoon of
October 16 and, with a few exceptions, remained
negative for the rest of the week. In the Brady
Commission’s view, this evidence provides impor-
tant support for the cascade theory,
THERE IS LESS TO rFIIE: CASCAIJE
THEORY THAN MEETS THE EYE
The Negative Basis
As mentioned, proponents of the cascade theory
suggest that their theory is supported by the nega-
‘Reportofthe Presidential Task Force on MarketMechanisms
(1988), p. vii.
tThe DOT System is a high-speed, order-routing system that
program traders useto execute simultaneous trades in the
cash and tutures markets.
‘Reportof the Presidential Task Forceon MarketMechanisms
(1988), p.v.
‘Ibid.. pp. 15, 17, 21, 30—36 and 69. It is apparent that our
knowledge of stock marketpanics has advanced considerably
in the 58 years since the 1929 crash. “Black Tuesday” was
caused by adownward price“spiral.” “Bloody Monday” was a
“cascade.”
“Report of thePresidential Task Forceon MarketMechanisms
(1988), pp. lII.1—1II,26, especially Il1,16—I11,22,
“See Figlewski (1984), pp. 658—60; Burns (1979), pp. 31—57;
Cornell and French (1983), pp. 2—4; Modest and Sundaresan
(1983), pp. 22—23;Santoni (1987), pp. 23—25; Schwarz, Hill
and Schneeweis (1986), pp. 326—46; Working (1977); Kawal-
ler, Koch and Koch (1987), p. 1311.22
Chart 1
Cash and December Futures
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































remains constant, Notice that this results in a
decline in the curr-ent price of the stock from
$17.50 to $1288, a reduction of about 30 percent.
Fur1hermore, since the expected price ofthe stock
one year from now falls to $13.27, the basis falls to
$391 = $1327— 812.881. Other things the same, a
decline in the expected growth i-ate of dividends
causes adecline in the curr-ent price, the futures
price and the basis. For reasons discussed later,
futures prices typically respond to new informa-
tion more rapidly than indexes of cash mas-ket
pr’ices. This was particularly so during the crash.
In terms of our example, if the futures pr-ice de-
clines immediately to $13.27but cash prices adjust
less quickly, the observed basis may be negative
during the adjustment period. In shor-t, there is no
need for a special theory, like the cascade theory,
to explain the behavior of the basis during the
week of October 19,’~
.trrationai Price-Insensitive Traders
Stock prices declined throughout the day of
October 19, 1987. The decline was particularly
sharp in the afternoon (see chart flAt about 1:30
p.m. EST, the price of aDecember S&.P 500 futures
contract was about 15 points lower than the cash
pi-ices of the stocks under-lying the contract (that
is, the basis was —15 points, see chart 2). This
means that liquidating the basket of stocks under-
lying the S&P 500 through futures mar-ket sales
was about $7,500 niore costly (before transaction
costsl than liquidating the same basket in the cash
market.” Yet, according to the cascade theory,
portfolio insurers continued to liquidate in the
futures mar’ket. In the words of the Brady Com-
mission, this appar-ently anomalous behavior was
the result of “mechanical price-insensitive selling.”
Put moie bluntly, the theory attributes the obser--
vation to irrationality on the part of porttblio man-
agers who, by most accounts — including those of
the Brady Commission — are credited with being
highly sophisticated financial experts.
The Missing il.rhs
The cascade theory depends on index arbitr-age
activity to transnut selling pressur-e from the fir-
tures to the cash market. Yet, by all accounts, in-
dcx arbitrage virtually ceased about 1:30 p.m. EST
on october’ 19.6 Cash market prices, however, fell
sharply between 1:30 and the market’s close. The
S&P 500 index lost about 30 points during this
time, while the Dow fell by more than 300 points.
Furtherniore, index ai-bitrage was severely re-
stricted in subsequent trading days because the
NYSE limited use ofits DOT system by arbitra-
geur-s. However, this did not pr’event afurther
sharp decline in stock prices on October 26.
Foreign Markets and Previous Panics
The cascade theory fails to explain why stock
market panics in for-eign markets occurred at the
same time as the US. panic. Programmed trading
is virtually nonexistent in overseas markets. Yet
these markets crashed as qirickly and by as much
as the U.S. market. Between October 16 and 23, for
example, the UK. stock market declined 22 per-
cent, the German and Japanese markets fell 12
percent, the French market fell 10 percent and the
U.S. market declined 13 percent. What’s more,
programmed trading dates back no further- than
1982 when stock index futures contracts began
trading. U.S. stock market panics have amuch
longer history. Since the cascade theory does not
explain these other panics, there is some reason to




A long-standing proposition in both economics
and finance is that stock prices ai’e formed in ef-
ficient mar’kets.” This means that all of the rele-
~‘ant information currently known about interest
r’ates, dividends and the future prospects for firms
(the fundamentals) is contained in current stock
prices. Stock prices change only when new infor-
mation regarding the fundamentals is obtained by
someone. New information, by definition, cannot
be predicted ahead of its arrival; because the news
is just as likelyto be good as it is to bebad, jumps
in stock pr-ices cannot be pi-edicted in advance.
Ifthe efficient markets hypothesis is correct,
past piice changes contain no useful information
“See, in addition, Malkiel (1988), pp. 5—B.
“Thevalue of a S&P 500 futures contract is $500 times the level
of the index, Consequently, it the cash market index is about
255 and the futures market index is about 240 as they were at
1:30 p.m. EST on October 19, the value of the basis: B
$500(240) — $500(255) = —$7,500.
“Seethe Reportof the Presidential Task Force on MarketMecha-
nisms (1988), pp. vi, 32 and 40; U.S. General Accounting
Office (1988), pp.43 and 45—46; U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (1988), pp. vi and 46.
“See Brealey and Meyers (1984), pp. 266—81; Malkiel (1981),
pp. 171—79; Brealey (1983), pp. 15—IS; Leroy (1982) and
Fama (1970).25
about future price changes. With some added
assumptions, this can be translated into auseful
empirical proposition. Iftransaction costs are low,
the expected return to holding stock is constant
and thevolatility of stock prices does not change
during the time period examined, the efficient
market hypothesis implies that observed changes
in stock prices will be uncorr’elated. The sequence
of prce changes are unrelated; they behave as
random variables. This is sometimes called
“weak form efficiency.”
This implication contiasts sharply with acen-
tral implication of the cascade theory. The cascade
theoiy suggests that price changes in both the
cash and futures markets are positively corielated
with their own past. This follows from the theory’s
circularity which attributes sharp price declines to
immediately preceding sharp declines.
The behavior of U.S. stock prices generally con-
forms to the efficient markets hypothesis in the
sense that past changes in stock prices contain no
useful information about future changes.” How-
ever, when data on stock price indexes are ob-
served at very high frequency lintra-day but not
day-to-day), changes in the level of cash niarket
indexes ar-ccorrelated and appear to lag changes
in futures prices.” This behavior appears to favor
the cascade theory. When difi’erences in the
‘mar-ket-making” techniques employed in the
cash and futures markets are taken into account,
however, intra-day data from both markets reject
the cascade theoiy, while, on the whole, they are
consistent with the efficient markets hypothesis.”
Market-Making in the Gash Market
Trading on the NYSE is conducted by members
who trade within an auction framework at posts
manned by specialists.” Specialists’ activities ar-c
concentrated on apar’ticular group of stocks that
are traded at aparticular post. One of the main
functions of a specialist is to execute limit orders
foi other members of the Exchange. A limit order
is an order to buy (sell) a specified number of
shares of agiven stock when and if the price of the
stockfalls (rises) to some specified level.The spe-
cialist maintains abook in which these orders ar-c
recorded and to which only lie has access. The
ability to place a limit order’ with a specialist frees
the hr-oker who places the order’ tr-om having to
wait at the post for a pr-ice movement that may
never-occur.
For example, suppose the infor-mation con-
tained in the specialist’s book for shar-es of XYZ
cot-poration is summarized in figure 1.” The de-
mand curve aggregates the purchase ordei’s that
have been placed with the specialist. These in-
clude bids of $9’/s for’ 400 shares, $9¾for 300
shares, etc.The supply curve aggregates the spe-
cialist’s sell orders of 100 shares at $l0’/s, 200
shares at $10’/4, etc. Broker’s, standing at the post,
trade XYZ shares with each other’ and the special-
ist. At any time, a brokei- may i-equest a quote fr’om
the specialist who, given the information in figure
1, would respond “$B’/s for 400, 100 at $10‘/s,” This
indicates that the specialist has buy or’der-s for 400
shares at $97/s and sell orders for 100 shares at
S10’/s. Ifthe buy and sell orders of the other bro-
kers at the post are in balance at the current price,
trading in XYZ shares will occur within the price
range of $9’/s bid and £10i/~ask.”
Suppose, however, that a broker has a market
buy order for 300 shares that he is unable to cross
with abroker with sell orders for 300 shares at the
quoted spr-ead (in this case, at an ask pr-ice of
$10’/s or less). Since the specialist’s quote indi-
cates that he will sell 100 shares at 510½,the bro-
ker will respond “Take it.” The broker has pur-
chased 100 shares from the specialist at $10’/s.
Since the broker must buy another 200 shares, he
will ask for a further- quote. Ifnothing further has
occur-red, the specialist will quote “$97s for 400,
200 at 810¼.”The broker will respond “Take it.”
The broker has satisfied the market buy order for
300 shares ofXYZ. He purchased 100 shares at
$10’/s and 200 shares at $10’/4. Of course, the bro-
ker could have acquired 300 shares immediately
by offering to pay aprice of $
10
i/
4 hut the cost
would have been gr-eater. Instead, it pays the bro-
ker to try to “walk up” the supply curve by execut-
ing anumber of trades rather than jumping di-
rectly to the pt-ice that will get him 300 shares in
“Malkiel (1981), Brealey(1983) and Fama (1970).
“See Perry (1985);Atchison, Butler and Simonds (1987) and
Harris (1988).
“SeeGrossman and Miller(1988) for a discussionof why trad-
ing rules many differ acrossthe markets.
“Ofcourse, the NYSE is not the only cash market for stocks, but
it is a major market. Because of its relative size, the discussion
focuses on this market.
“For purposes of exposition, the figure anddiscussion ignore
the effect of “stops” and “stop loss orders” on the book.
“SeeStoll (1985), Shultz (1946), pp. 119—44 and TheNew York
Stock Exchange Market(1979), pp. 14—21 and pp. 30—31 -26
Figure 1
An Illustration of Limit Order Supply and Demand
Quantity
(in hundreds)
one trade.” Similar reasoning applies to situations
in which excess market sell orders exist at the
quoted spread.
Notice that this process of “walking up” the
supply curve or’ “walking down” the demand
curve can generate asequence of recorded trans-
action pr ces that run in the same direction. The
larger the excess of market buy (or sell) orders is
relative to the size of the specialist’s limit order-s at
various prices, the longer the sequence ofre-
corded transaction prices that run in the same
direction and the greater the likelihood that re-
corded price changes overthe time interval ar’e
correlated. This situation is particularly likely to
arise during panics when large order imbalances
develop at quoted pr-ices.
Specialist Rule 104
Specialists are required by rule SR 104 to main-
tain a “fair and otderly” market. More specifically,
the rule states that
Itilie maintenance of a fair and orderly market im-









“Under NYSE rules, public orders have precedence overspe-
cialists’orders at the same price. See Stoll (1985), p. 7.27
sonablr depth, and the minimizing ofthe effects of
temporary disparity between supply and demand.
In connection with the maintenance ofa fair and
or’der’lymarket, it is commonly desir’ahle that a
specialist engage to areasonahle degreeunder exist-
ing circumstances in dealings for his own account
when lack ofprice continuity, lack of depth. or clis—
paritybetween supply and demand exists or’ is rea-
sonably tobe anticipated.”
Forexample, rule SR 104requires the specialist
to buy shares forhis own account to assist the
maintenance of an orderly mar-ket if~ in his estima-
tion, sell orders temporarily exceed buy orders at
the existing market price and conversely. Ifthese
imbalances are truly temporary, the trades re-
quir-ed by SR 104 will be profitable for- the special-
ist; evidence indicates that specialists typically sell
on up ticks in pr-ice and buy on down ticks.” If
large order imbalances develop that threaten the
orderliness ofthe market, the specialist may insti-
tute an opening delay ortrading halt.The special-
ist needs the approval of afloor official or- governor
to do this and to establish a new opening price.”
The effect ofSR 104 is to smooth what would
otherwise be abrupt movements in stock prices, at
least over shor4 periods of time afew minutes).
Rather than allowing the price to move directly to
sor~renew level, specialist trading temporarily
retards the movement. This can generate a se-
quence of cor-related pt-ice changes.
Mark.et~Ma king in theFutures Market
Trading in futures mar-kets is governed by CFTC
r-ules that require all trades offutures contracts to
be executed openly arid competitively by “open
outcry.” In particular, the trading arena, or pit, has
no single auctioneer through whom all trades ar-c
funneled. Rather, the pit is composed of many
trader-s who call out their bids and offers to each
other. The traders are not required to stabilize the
mar-ket. They may at any time take any side of a
transaction even though this might add to an im-
balance of buy and sell orders at the quoted price,
and they may leave the pit (r-efuse to trade) at any
time. At the time of the crash, there was no rule
regarding limit moves in the price of the Standar-d
and Poor’s futures contract.
‘I’hese rules contain no r-equirement to smooth
out movements in the price. Tr’aders ar-cfree to
move the price immediately to a new level. Unlike
the cash market, there are no trading rules in fu-
tures markets that are likely to result in correlated
price changes. Furthermore, since there were no
rules that retarded price changes in the futures
market, futures prices were fl-ce to adjust more
quickly than cash prices so changes in futur-es
prices may lead changes in cash prices.
.Diflèrent instruments
It is important to note that different instruments
are traded in the cash and futures markets. Stock
index futures contracts are agreements between a
seller )short position) and a buyer (long position)
to acash settlement based on the change in a
stock index’s value between the date the contract
is enter-ed by the two par-ties and some future
date.” The instrument underlying the futures con-
tract is alarge basket of different stocks, that is,
the stocks contained in the Major-Market Index,
the Value Line index, the S&.P 500 Index, etc. No
such instrument is traded in the cash market,
where purchasing or- selling 500 different stocks,
for example, requires as many different transac-
tions arid can only be executed at significantly
higher-costs.”
The different instruments traded in the cash
and futures mar-kets have afurther implication for
rhe relationship between observed price changes
between the two n arkets. The cash market prices
shown in chart 1, as well as those examined by the
Brady Commission, are measured by an index.
The index is an average of the prices of all the
stocks included in the index. When the index is
observed at avery high frequency (say, minute-by-
minute), some of the stocks included in the index
may riot have traded during the interval between
observations, ifnot, the level of cash prices mea-
sured by the index includes some prices from
previous observations. in other words, the index
“Report ot thePresidential Task Force on MarketMechanisms
(1988), p. vi—7, Rule 104 is takenseriously. See pp. vi—9.
“See Stoll (1985), pp. 35—36,
“It wasthe application of SR 104 that resulted in the opening
delays and trading halts thatoccurred during the week of
October 19. Forstocks included in the S&P 500, these delays
and halts averaged 51 minutes on October19and 78 minutes
on October20, See U.S. General AccountingOffice (1988), p.
“SeeSchwarz, Hill and Schneeweis (1986), p.9.
“For example, the cost of tradingone futurescontract based on
theStandard and Poor’s500 is about $500 lower than trading
the equivalent basket of stocks in the cash market. See Miller,
Hawke, Malkiel and Scholes (1987), p. 11, and U.S. General
Accounting Office (1988), p. 20.
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includes some “stale” prices. The term used to
describe this phenomenon is “nonsynchronous
trading.”
Typically, nonsynchr’onous tr’ading does not
cr-eate a serious measur-ement problem. Under-
normal conditions, abuy or- sell order is executed
in about two minutes on the NYSE. On October 16
and during the week ofOctober 19, however, the
time required to execirte orders rose markedly:”
On those days, the index contained aconsiderable
number ofstale prices.” The subsequent piece-
meal adjustment of these stale prices for indiiid-
ual stocks could explain correlated changes in the
level of the cash market index. This is shown in
the table 2 example. The example assumes that
the index is a simple average ofthe prices of three
stocks (A, B and C) divided by the average price in
period zem and multiplied by 100. The initial
prices (in period zero) are equilibrium pr-ices (i.e.,
they contain all currently available relevant infor-
mation). Then, new information becomes available
in period I that eventually will cause a 10 percent
decline in all stock prices. if there is nonsynchro-
nous trading, the revisions will occur- piecemeal
for each ofthe stocks. One example of this is
shown in the table: the price of stock A falls in
period 1, the price of stock B falls in period 2, etc.
Ifthe index is repor-ted in each per-iod, it will dis-
play positively corr’eiated changes as shown in the
table.
The stale price pr-ohlem is not relevant for fu-
tures mar’ket prices; futures prices are actual
prices. Asa result, changes in futures prices will
appear to lead changes in the cash mar-ket index if
the index contains asubstantial number of stale
prices.
THE DIFFEHE’NT IMPLICATIONS
The centr-al feature of the cascade theory is that
declines in cash and futures prices reinforced
each other and led to further declines in both
markets. The theory suggests that declines in the
pr-ice of stock index futures contr-acts caused a
decline in the cash prices of the underlying stocks,
and this dr’op caused afurther decline in the
pr-ices of index futures contracts. Ifthe theory is
correct, changes in cash prices will be positively
correlated with past changes in the price of index
futures and conversely. The cascade theory fur-
ther-implies that price changes in cacti market are
positively correlated with their own past changes.
This follows from the circularity ofthe theory
which attr-ibutes sharp declines in stock prices to
immediately preceding sharp declines. Finally,
since the cascade theory contends that this spe-
cificbehavior caused the panic, these correlations
should be observed during the panic, but not at
other times.
The efficient markets hypothesis suggests that
market-making in the cash market and nonsyn-
chronous trading could produce intra-day cash
market price changes that are correlated. Further-
more, the hypothesis suggests that changes in
futures prices may lead changes in cash prices.
These implications are similar to the implications
of the cascade theory. The two differ’, however, in
three important respects. Unlike the cascade the-
ory, the efficient markets hypothesis suggests that:
(11 Changes in the price of stock index futures
contracts are uncorrelated,
(2) Changes in cash prices do not lead changes
in futures prices, and
i3) Relationships that exist across the two mar-
kets are not unique to the panic.
“See U.S. General Accounting Office (1988), p. 73.
“See Harris (1988); Reportof the Presidential Task Force on
MarketMechanisms (1988), p. 30; Miller, Hawke, Malkiel and
Scholes (1987), pp. 21—22 and 34—35;U.S. Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (1988), pp. v, IS and 8-1
through 8-9.29
TESTING THE TWO THE’ORIES
These theories are tested using minute-by-
minute data on the level of the Standard and
Poor’s 500 index (S&P 500) and the price of the
December 1987 Standard and Poor’s 500 index
futures contract (S&P 500 Futur-es). The level of the
S&,P 500 index represents the cash price of the
stocks underlying the S&P 500 futures contr-act. All
tests are conducted using first differ’ences of the
natural logs ofthe levels. This tr-ansformation of
the data approximates one-minute per-centage
changes (expressed in decimals) in cash and fu-
tures market prices. The data cover’the trading
days immediately before, during and after the
panic: October 16, 19 and 20.”
A fewcomments about the data are important.
The NYSE, on which the great bulk of the stocks
included in the S&P 500 index are traded, was
open from 9:30 am. to 4:00 p.m. ES~’T’ on the above
days. The CME, which trades the S&P 500 futures
contract, was open from 9:30 am. to 4:15 p.m. ES’I’
on October 16 and 19; on October 20, however,
trading in the S&.P 500 futures contract was halted
from 12:15 p.m. to 1:05 p.m. EST. All tests reported
here eyclude the period on October20 when trad-
ing in the futures mar-ket was halted.
Were changes in Stock Prices
Correlated?
Table 3 presents the results of atest (called a
Box-Pier-ce test) based on the estimated autocorre-
lations ofpercentage changes in cash market
prices. This test is designed to determine whether
the data ar-c significantly correlated, that is,
whether current changes in cash market prices
ar-crelated to their- own past changes. Both theo-
ries discussed in this paper suggest that intra-day,
high-frequency cash market price changes will be
positively correlated, although the reasons for the
positive correlation are considerably different. Asa
result, these data do not help discriminate be-
tween the two theories. ifthe data pr’ove inconsis-
tent with this implication, however, neither- theory
performs well in explaining the behavior of cash
market prices.
The data in table 3 indicate that minute-to-
minute changes in the S&P 500 Index ar-c signifi-
cantly correlated. Furthermore, the correlations
ar-c positive at least over the initial lag.”
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Table 4 presents the results of the same test for’
the December S&.P 500 futures contract. Tin, ef-
ficient markets hypothesis and the absence of
specialist traders suggest that these changes ar-c
not correlated. Conversely, the cascade theory
“Minute-by-minute price datawere alsoexamined for October
IS and 21—23. In eachcase, the qualitative resultswere the
same asthose presented here.
“These correlationsare analyzed furtherbelow.30
pr-edicts that percentage changes in the futures
price will he positively correlated.
‘the data pr-esented in table 4 ar-c consistent
utursM*i~et N with the efficient mar-kets hypothesis, not the cas-
coefficientsand cade theory. None of the test statistics for’ October
So Pl*ce~tstI~~r irst N 16 (panel A), October20 (panel D( and for the hulk
DIffmtn~s ~gs~ft* of the trading day on October19 (panel C) indicate
Mfrn!*~by4*ut~ Pn~e significant corr-elations at conventional signifi—
~Rdu ~ntr*cfl cance levels~.’fheseprice changes are serially un-
cor-related.’~Data for- the first 90 minutes of tr’ading
Ps~t* Oøpbe~ ~ on October-19 (panel B) are an exception. During
A$ret ~ this period, changes in the futures pr-ice wer-e sig-
~cOeftk$%* ~statt nificantly correlated with the change the previous
ruinirte. This correlation, however’, is negative, nor
positive as the cascade theory implies.” Thus, the
evrdence presented in table 4 is inconsistent with
420 8 the cascade theory, while, on the whole, it con-
/ $0 forms to the efficient markets hypothesis.
S is the Cash Market Efficient?
S a ssaaS$U. The table 3 results indicate that intr’a-day
/ ‘A~ta~’n changes in cash market prices are cor-related. Put
S another way, past price changes contain some
rnformatron about future changes for- the next few
minutes. Is this infor-mation useful in the sense
3 / that it can be pr-ofitabiv exploited by traders? Ifso,
it would suggest that cash market trader’s do riot
1’ incorporate information efficiently. This, of course,
would provide evidence against the effir:ient mar-
kets hypothesis.
~sneIC ~1flWj ~aa 41 ~tSfl -
In par’t, the answer’ to this question depends on
the length of the time per-iod over-which the pr-ice
t~~tit , changes are r-elated. if the time period is short,
1 2 03 shorter- than the time required to execute a trans-
S At? action, the infor-mation contained in past pr-ice
I changes cannot be exploited profitably and the
cash market is efflr-,ient,
‘l’ahle 5 helps answer this question. The tables
data ar-c estimates of the length of the lagged rela-
~ rionship between current and past cash market
price changes for October 16, 19 arid 20. The esti-
mates were obtained by r’egressing the contempo-
raneous minute-to-minute price change on the 15
029 previous minute-to-minute pr-ice changes. Ini-
tially, this specification was identified as the unre-
e stricted model, To determine whether’ the esti-
at is
S ‘~! “Thesame result was obtained when datafor October 15 and
21—23 were examined.
vrltlcatvSjetor 4lagsrsaS’ 4$oxPler *1’bcio “This puzzlingresult forthe first 90 minutes of tradingon Octo-
ète$ ot syaWerrtdlealessi~tr,cante otorrelatron. ber 19 may be due to the fact that manystocks had not yet
C ~ ~ ,~ .m opened fortrading on the NYSEand the rumorsat that time
that the SECwould calla trading halt. See Miller, Hawke,
Malkieland Scholes (1987), wire report summary.31
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mated coefficients am’e sensitive to the laglength
and to identily statistically redundant lags, the lag
stm-uctur-e was successively shor’tened by one lag.
At each stage, the t-statistic forthe coefficient of
the most distant lagwas examined. Ifthe test indi-
cated the coefficient was statistically insignificant,
that lagwas dropped and the equation was r’eesti-
mated with one less lag. ‘l’his process was r’e-
peated until the test r-ejected the hypothesis that
the estimated coefficient of the most distant re—
maining lagwas zero!”
The estimates shown in table 5 indicate that the
lags ranged from about two minutes on October’ 16
to five minutes on October 20.” It r-equir-es about
two minutes to execute atrade on the NYSE under
normal trading conditions. During the panic, exe-
cution times ranged from about 10 to 75 minutes
at tirues.” in view of this, the lags estimated in
table 5 do not appear’ to be long enough to r-eject
the efficient muar-ketshypothesis; also, since they
varied over the period, it is doubtfnl that past
pr-icechanges contained information that could
be exploited by traders.
Did Stock Price Changes Reinforce
Each Other Across Markets?
The central feature of the cascade theory can be
tested by deternunirig whether- past pr-icechanges
in the futur-es market help explain cur-rent price
changes in the cash market and conversely. This is
done by regr-essing the change in cash prices on
past changes in cash prices; then, past changes in
futures pr-ices ar-cadded to the estimated r-egres-
sion equation to see if they imnpr-ove the equation’s
explanatory power. An F-test is conducted to de-
termine whether- the addition of the futures mar-
ket data significantly increases the cash price
equation’s coefficient of determination (H’). The
“See Anderson (1971), pp. 223 and 275—76. It is possiblethat
this test may reject some lagsthat are, in fact, significant if
taken asa group. To controlfor this, F-tests were run with the
lag length in the unrestrictedmodel setat 15. Thenumberof
lags in the restricted modelwas set at 12 to determine if the
three omitted lags weresignificant. The lags in the restricted
model wasthen reducedto nine and the test repeated, etc.
problem thatthe probability of rejectingthe null hypothesis (the
estimatedcoefficient is zero) when it is true rises asthe lag
length is reduced. Consequently, the true lag lengths may be
shorter than those estimated in tableS. See Batten and Thorn-
ton (1983), pp. 22—23, and Anderson (1971), pp. 30—43.
“U.S. Government Accounting Office (1988), p. 73.
“The lag had declined to about three minutes by October 23.







test is then revcrsed, with the change in ftrtures
prices as the dependent variahle.
The r-esults of this test are presented in table 6
for each of the trading days examined in this pa-
per-. The laglength employed on each day is the
one identified by the table 5 test.”The results for
cash market prices show that the addition of past
changes in futures prices improve the regression
estimates; this suggests that price changes in the
futures mar-ketpreceded those in the cash market.
‘I’his r-esult is consistent with both the cascade
theory and the efficient mar’kets hypothesis. Fur’-
them-more, it is not unique to the panic; it has been
observed for intm-a-day price data during other
periods as well.4’
Other table 6 results, however-, are inconsistent
with the cascade theory. The inclusion of past
changes in cash prices in the regressions that
estimate the change in futures pr-ices does not sig-
nificantly impr-ove the estimates, This rejects the
notion that past changes in cash prices help ex-
plain changes in ftrtures prices. ‘I’his finding is
inconsistent with the centr-al featur-e ofthe cas-
cade theory, which suggests the panic was caused
by declines in cash and futures prices that became
lar-ger as they tumbled over’each other on the way
down,
CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the cascade theory,
which has been advanced as an explanation of the
October 1987 stock market panic. The theory relies
on the notion that stock traders behave “mechani-
cally,” are “insensitive to price,” and execute
“Hsiao(1981) uses asimilar method. These lag lengths applyto
the cash market, Analysis ofthe futures market suggests that
the appropriate lagfor this market is zero.
“See Kawaller, Koch and Koch (1987).
tr-ansactions in markets without regard to transac-
tion costs, ‘these assertions are inconsistent with
the behavior ofwealth-maximizing individuals.
Not only ar-cthe theoretical underpinnings of the
cascade theory weak, the data do not support the
theory. tnstead, the observed relationships that do
exist between the markets are not unique to the
cr-ashand can be explained by a theory that relies
on wealth maximizing behavior-.
Almost 60 years later’, the cause ofthe ‘Great
Cr-ash” in October 1929 is still being debated.
Those with even longer memories know that them-c
is little agm’eement about what caused the stock
market panic in 1907. Although financial reforms
followed each of these panics, history indicates
that the refomms have done little to r-educe the
frequency or- severity of panics. Without a reliable
theoretical guide to the mechanics of apanic, any
r-eform is no more than a “shot in the dark.” The
evidence presented in this paper suggests that the
reform,s advanced by proponents ofthe cascade
theory are unlikely to alter-this historical pattern.
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